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ARTICLES
From Sterne and Borges to Lost
Storytellers: Cyberspace, Narrative, and
Law
Shulamit Almog∗
Into what fictive realms can imagination
translate you . . . ?
—W.H. Auden, The Horatians1
INTRODUCTION
El Aleph, a short story by Jorge Luis Borges, was published in
1945.2 In this story, Borges himself is one of the two central
characters. The other is an imaginary poet, Carlos Argentino
Daneri, the cousin of Beatriz Viterbo, a woman Borges loved.
After Beatriz dies, Borges visits her home each year on her
birthday and spends time with Daneri and Beatriz’s father. On one
of these melancholy occasions, Borges accidentally discovers the
∗
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presented in May of 2002, during the second European Conference of the International
Society for Literature and Science, held at the University of Aarhus, Denmark. The
author is grateful to the participants in the conference for some insightful remarks, and to
Ariel Bendor, Aaron Ben Zeev, Michael Birnhack, and Gabriel Zoran for important
comments on early drafts of this Article and for fruitful conversations with them that
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1
In W.H. AUDEN, CITY WITHOUT WALLS (1969).
2
JORGE LUIS BORGES, The Aleph, in ALEPH AND OTHER STORIES 1933–1969 (Norman
Thomas di Giovanni ed. & trans., 1978) (1945).
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secret of the Aleph. Daneri, seized with emotion, tells Borges that
unscrupulous entrepreneurs intend to destroy his home and deprive
him of the Aleph that he had discovered during his childhood in
the cellar. Without it, he would not be able to complete the long
poem upon which he was working. The Aleph, as he explains to
Borges, “is one of the points in space that contains all other
points.” It is “the only place on earth where all places are seen
from every angle.”3
Borges asks Daneri to show him the Aleph, and is given
directions by Daneri as to how the connection is established.
Daneri instructs Borges to descend to the cellar, lie flat on his
back, focus his eyes on the nineteenth step, and wait a few
moments. He does so, and the Aleph appears. How can it be
described? Borges writes:
And here begins my despair as a writer. . . . How, then, can
I translate into words the limitless Aleph, which my
floundering mind can scarcely encompass? . . . What I
want to do is impossible, for any listing of an endless series
is doomed to be infinitesimal.4
Today, fifty-five years after this enigmatic story appeared, we can
all have a personal Aleph. It is not as total as the Borgesian Aleph,
but it leads towards an endless space. It is the Internet.5 The
Internet is not only a revolutionary technology.6 It also represents
3

BORGES, supra note 2, at 15, 23.
Id. at 26.
5
For a similar use of the Borgesian Aleph as an image relevant to the Internet age, see
generally GEORGE P. LANDOW, HYPERTEXT: THE CONVERGENCE OF CONTEMPORARY
CRITICAL THEORY AND TECHNOLOGY 12 (1992).
6
Today, it is hardly necessary to define the technology known as the Internet. The
author will, however, provide a short but elucidating description of the Internet,
cyberspace, and the nature of navigating the Web by Justice Stevens:
The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers. It is
the outgrowth of what began in 1969 as a military program called
“ARPANET,” which was designed to enable computers operated by the
military, defense contractors, and universities conducting defense—related
research to communicate with one another by redundant channels even if some
portions of the network were damaged in a war. While the ARPANET no
longer exists, it provides an example for the development of a number of
civilian networks that, eventually linking with each other, now enable tens of
millions of people to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts
4
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some essential and far-advanced cultural shifts, as well as
transformations in some of our social and cultural practices. Such
transformations inevitably influence many institutions.
Before elaborating, it is important to understand that the
Internet and all the various practical applications derived from it
are associated with a broad range of meanings and influences. The
use of electronic mail, the search for answers to specific queries,
scholarly research, political, commercial, and artistic uses all have
unique significances and implications. What follows is not an
attempt to assemble the entire cluster of uses under a single overall
perspective. Instead, this essay attempts to suggest that one aspect
of the Internet experience or the Internet culture is relevant to our
narrative competence, cognizance, and ability to become
storytellers and story listeners.
The Internet initiates and
continuously induces important shifts in our storytelling practices
and narrative cognizance.
These shifts carry significant
implications in the domain of law. They influence the way we
practice law and the way we perceive it. They affect our
comprehension of law and the range of anticipations, hopes, and
emotions related to it.

of information from around the world. The Internet is “a unique and wholly
new medium of worldwide human communication.”
Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of
communication and information retrieval methods. These methods are
constantly evolving and difficult to categorize precisely. But, as presently
constituted, those most relevant to this case are electronic mail (e-mail),
automatic mailing list services (“mail exploders,” sometimes referred to as
“listservs”), “newsgroups,” “chat rooms,” and the “World Wide Web.” All of
these methods can be used to transmit text; most can transmit sound, pictures,
and moving video images. Taken together, these tools constitute a unique
medium—known to its users as “cyberspace”—located in no particular
geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with
access to the Internet.
....
Navigating the Web is relatively straightforward. A user may either type the
address of a known page or enter one or more keywords into a commercial
“search engine” in an effort to locate sites on a subject of interest. A particular
Web page may contain the information sought by the “surfer,” or, through its
links, it may be an avenue to other documents located anywhere on the
Internet.”
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849–52 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
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I. LAW AND STORY
Our social existence is organized around narratives.7 One
could describe a significant part of human experience by using the
image of an immense reservoir of narrative structures. These
structures produce meaning and organize different realms of
reality. Each narrative creates a distinct segment that can be
grasped within the chaotic whole that surrounds us. Practically,
the narrative function is to construct the world “not just according
to how the world is, but according to its own categories.”8
Almost any social and cultural construct could be perceived as
a collection of symbols that brings about an intellectual and
emotional response. But what is it that transforms certain
expressions into a discernable collection of symbols? How do
disparate expressions cluster together and turn into the
representation of a distinct phenomenon? The issue is manifold,
but one of the most important factors is narrative.9 An important
function of narrative is the creation of organized constructs out of
unorganized data fields.10 As Jonathan Culler elaborates:
Stories, the argument goes, are the main way we make
sense of things, whether in thinking of our lives as a
progression leading somewhere or in telling ourselves what
is happening in the world . . . [Life] follows not a scientific
logic of cause and effect but the logic of story, where to
7

The definition of narrative, its substance, its functioning, and the relationship
between it and the plot are issues that have attracted extensive research. See, e.g., MIEKE
BAL, NARRATOLOGY: INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF NARRATIVE (Christine van
Boheemen trans., 1985) (1980); PETER BROOKS, READING FOR THE PLOT: DESIGN AND
INTENTION IN NARRATIVE (1984); JONATHAN CULLER, LITERARY THEORY 83–94 (1997);
GERALD PRINCE, NARRATOLOGY: THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF NARRATIVE (1982);
SHLOMIT RIMMON-KENAN, NARRATIVE FICTION: CONTEMPORARY POETICS (1983).
8
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 116 (2000).
9
See Goran Aijmer, The Symbolical Project, 13 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 66, 69 (2001)
(“The sphere of symbolic creation suggests studies of how textures of complex iconology
are accomplished by an integration of less inclusive icons into ever more comprehensive
symbolic clusters. The grammar of such iconic image—making is one of architecture
rather than syntax. What we are dealing with is a sort of ‘concrete’ . . . compositional
process, a creation independent of mundane facts.”).
10
See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 7, at 3–36; CULLER, supra note 7, at 83–94; MICHAEL
ROMER: TELLING STORIES: POSTMODERNISM AND THE INVALIDATION OF TRADITIONAL
NARRATIVE (1995) (discussing the centrality of narrative in human experience).
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understand is to conceive of how one thing leads to
another, how something might have come about . . . .11
The central role of narrative in creating concepts of self and
society has become clear in a variety of fields, including those
addressing law-related issues, such as race, community, gender,
and the practice of law.12
The discipline of law and literature constituted a significant
contribution to the study of the links between law and narrative.13
In his seminal work, The Legal Imagination, James Boyd White
differentiates between “the mind that tells a story” and “the mind
that gives reason.”14 A central act within the legal field is to
master “both sorts of discourse (both narrative and analysis) and
put them to work, at the same time and despite their
inconsistencies, in the service of a larger enterprise.”15 The
apparently impossible reconciliation between “these discordant
modes of thought and expression, these incompatible,
uncommunicating, sides of oneself”16 is one of the central acts of
the legal mind, and one of the achievements of the legal
imagination.
As Binder and Weisberg recently noted, “a
11

CULLER, supra note 7, at 83–84.
David M. Engel, Origin Myths: Narratives of Authority, Resistance, Disability, and
Law, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 785, 789–90 (1993).
13
See, e.g., SANDRA BERNS, TO SPEAK AS A JUDGE: DIFFERENCE, VOICE AND POWER
(1999); ROBERT COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT
COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992); BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND
NARRATIVE COHERENCE (1991); LINDA H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION:
NARRATIVE IN THE RHETORIC OF AUTHORITY (1995); LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); GARY MINDA,
POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 149–66
(1995); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND
PUBLIC LIFE (1995); DAVID RAY PAPKE, NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE (1991);
BERT VAN ROERMUND, LAW, NARRATIVE AND REALITY (1997); THOMAS ROSS, JUST
STORIES: HOW THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS (1996); BARRY R. SCHALLER, A
VISION OF AMERICAN LAW: JUDGING LAW, LITERATURE AND THE STORIES WE TELL
(1997); MICHAEL THOMPSON, REPRODUCING NARRATIVE: GENDER, REPRODUCTION AND
LAW (1998); IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES 4–15
(1996); ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY AND THE LAW (4th ed. 1993). See also
GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISM OF LAW 201–87 (2000)
(offering a comprehensive survey of the law and literature related narrative discourse).
14
JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 859 (1973).
15
Id.
16
Id.
12
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substantial body of research in the sociology of law suggests that
the portals of the law are guarded by narrative.”17 According to
Amsterdam and Bruner’s apt phrasing, “Law begins . . . after
narrative.”18 Soon after entering law’s portals, we inevitably
encounter narratives once again; they are present wherever we go
within law’s domain.
The next section suggests a preliminary “narrative map” that
designates narrative spaces in the legal field, and illustrates the
breadth of narrative influences and functions. This Article will
serve as a typology of the dependencies of law on narrative, and
will manifest the ways in which law and narrative continuously
intertwine. This map suggests areas of legal practice that implicate
two prominent forms of narrativity: generative narratives and
functional narratives.
II. GENERATIVE NARRATIVES
Glanville Williams referred to law as “a collection of symbols
capable of evoking ideas and emotions, together with the ideas and
emotions so evoked.”19 What force managed to unite certain
expressions and transform them into “symbols” that represent
“law?” Can we locate, define, and describe the elusive moment
when law emerged? Derrida aptly expressed this query: “How are
we to distinguish between the force of law of a legitimate power

17

BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 13, at 248–49.
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 8, at 283.
19
Glanville Williams, Language and the Law, 61 LAW Q. REV. 71, 86 (1945) (It is
impossible to make a sharp distinction between the various components included in his
definition. “We need not dispute whether it is primarily symbol or primarily idea or
primarily emotion; sometimes one, sometimes another aspect may be predominant, but
usually all three are inseparably connected.”). See also PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF
LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 3 (1997) (“This myth of
law is composed of an aggregation of ideas, values, and symbols linked by historical
circumstance.”); JOHN B. THOMPSON, CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS: A STUDY IN THE
THOUGHT OF PAUL RICOEUR AND JURGEN HABERMAS 6 (1981) (referencing the primary
significance of symbols: “I am convinced that we must think, not behind the symbols, but
starting from symbols, . . . that they constitute the revealing substrate of speech which
lives among men. In short, the symbol gives rise to thought.”).
18
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and the supposedly originary violence that must have established
this authority?”20
Derrida emphasizes that violence characterized the moment of
law’s creation. The key element is not violence but some kind of
enchantment that is sometimes generated by words, by certain uses
of language, and by the evocative power of a story. This
enchantment pertains to “generative narratives,” those stories that
depict the transition from lawless existence into an existence that
includes law in comprehensible terms. Additionally, generative
narratives can shape the way we imagine law and establish our
expectations from the law, and they constitute potential ways of
changing or reforming law.
There are many modes of generative narratives. Some are
present in literature’s classics. One of the more famous plots of
law emergence is the Oresteia, a trilogy by Aeschylus,21 which is
comprised of three plays, Agamemnon, Choephori, and Eumenides.
Orestes, the son of Agamemnon, kills his mother and her lover in
revenge for the murder of his father. He is pursued by the Furies,
the avenging goddesses, and flees from Argos to Delphi and then
to Athens. The goddess Athena proposes settling the dispute by
holding a tribunal on the Areopagus, and the first court of justice is
founded. Orestes is acquitted and is allowed to return to Argos.
Athena has ended the circle of violence from which society had
suffered for generations, and has founded a new order: the rule of
law.22

20
Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 919, 927 (1990).
21
AESCHYLUS, THE ORESTEIA OF AESCHYLUS (George Thompson ed., Adolf M. Hakkert
1966) (458 B.C.E.).
22
See, e.g., Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic
Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 197, 212 (1995)
(maintaining that narratives “come to constitute the hegemony that in turn shapes social
lives and conduct”). Yet, the same narratives can be subversive, and challenge the
dominant social paradigm. The way we perceive narratives depends on existing social
conditions, disparities of power, and ideological effect. Id. at 222. The complexity of
generative narratives and their depth make them more prone to attract opposing, even
dichotomizing, readings and understandings. See, e.g., MARIA ARISTODEMOU, LAW AND
LITERATURE: JOURNEYS FROM HER TO ETERNITY 58–80 (2000) (reading the Oresteia as a
subversive narrative).
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In what sense is the Oresteia relevant to contemporary legal
discourse? It is relevant in the same way literary classics are
pertinent to human existence. Italo Calvino, while describing this
kind of relevance, refers to the classics of literature as works
“which exercise a particular influence, both when they imprint
themselves on our imagination as unforgettable, and when they
hide in the layers of memory disguised as the individual’s or the
collective unconscious.”23
Similar qualities characterize generative narratives that
originate from other cultural sources, such as scripture, canonical
works of philosophy, psychology or political thought, and
significant historical events. Following are several examples
gathered from contemporary discourse.
Austin Sarat describes how the biblical story of Akedah, the
narrative of Abraham and his son Isaac, is “enormously important
for the ways this culture imagines law as well as fatherhood.”24
Milner S. Ball tells how biblical stories play an important role in
the way we perceive the “real” world of law.25 Thus, the story of
giving the law to Moses at Mount Sinai, and the way in which
Moses represents both God and the Hebrew people at the same
time, creates a major narrative of legal advocacy associated with
the practice of modern lawyers.26 The story about Rachel weeping
for her children, that “transcends both law and morality,”27 and
God’s response, creates, according to Ball’s reading, a
fundamental narrative relevant to “law’s capacity to accommodate
things too deep for words”28 and to contemporaneous legal issues,
23
ITALO CALVINO, WHY READ THE CLASSICS? 4 (Martin McLaughlin trans., 1999)
(1991).
24
Austin Sarat, Imagining the Law of the Father: Loss, Dread, and Mourning in The
Sweet Hereafter, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 3, 12 (2000). Sarat also draws on Freudian
psychoanalytic theory to analyze how the psychoanalytic narrative of fatherhood “called
attention to the complex associations of paternity and legality.” Id. at 13. See also Peter
Goodrich, Maladies of the Legal Soul: Psychoanalysis and Interpretation in Law, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1035, 1047 (1997) (“Freud and those who follow him depict a law
that is modeled upon the power of the father. They elaborate a symbolic order that is
patriarchal in its norms and methods.”).
25
MILNER S. BALL, CALLED BY STORIES 4 (2000).
26
Id. at 9–21.
27
Id. at 89.
28
Id. at 1.
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such as the role of emotion in the judicial process.29 As Ball
emphasizes, though the first audience of the biblical narratives is
their first communities, Jews and Christians, those narratives have
never been limited to religious communities and were not meant to
be. Their “fundamental and freeing”30 qualities are available to
any audience, anytime, and to present-day legal discourse.
To use J. Hillis Miller’s phrasing, all sorts of generative
narratives, whether their source is literary, religious, historic, or
any other, manifest “a peculiar and unexpected relation between
the affirmation of universal moral law and storytelling.”31 As
Miller elucidates, it would seem that the connection of such a law
to any particular narrative or to narration at large would be
adventitious, or superficial, but in actual fact, ethics and narration
cannot be kept separate, “not because stories contain the thematic
dramatization of ethical situations, choices and judgments . . . [but]
because ethics itself has a peculiar relation to that form of language
we call narrative.”32
In other words, narratives transform abstract constructs or
formulas into expressions loaded with ethical meaning. Without
the presence of some kind of validating narrative in the
background, the law and the norm are like empty shells, with no
intelligible ethical substance within.33
29

Ball intersects the biblical narrative with specific situations, such as a plant closing
and the subsequent movement of jobs to Mexico and legal disputes over the sovereignty
of native Hawaiians. Id. at 81–105.
30
Id. at 6.
31
J. HILLIS MILLER, THE ETHICS OF READING 2 (1987).
32
Id. at 3. Miller also comments on the complex character of the links between moral
law and narrative: “[T]he moral law gives rise by an intrinsic necessity to storytelling,
even if that storytelling in one way or another puts in question or subverts the moral law.”
Id. at 2. See also Ewick & Silbey, supra note 22, at 222 (regarding the subversive
potential of narratives).
33
Here lies another intricate conceptual difficulty, which is highly relevant to both law
and literature: What endows a particular articulation authoritative nature? J. Hillis Miller,
while addressing the legislative powers of narrative, aptly phrases the question: “Both
law and literature depend on resolving (or tacitly avoiding) the vexed question of the
validity of example, or, in traditional rhetorical terms, the validity of synecdoche, part
standing for whole.” J. HILLIS MILLER, TOPOGRAPHIES 82 (1995). Up to a certain point,
that mysterious metamorphosis is precisely what law does when it transforms the
individual case into norm, or, to use Miller’s terms, crowns a synecdoche with general
validity.
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Law needs narratives in order to resolve oppositions of all
kinds and to maintain a constant acknowledgment of its legitimacy
and authority. As Robert Cover put it, “For every constitution
there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture . . . law and
narrative are inseparably related. Every prescription is insistent in
its demand to be located in discourse—to be supplied with history
and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and purpose.”34 Every
legal regime draws legitimacy and authority from some generative
narrative.
Generative narratives are continually activated in our
consciousness even if no direct reference is made to them during
the daily function of law’s machinery. Around them, we keep
accumulating symbols, knowledge, and other stories, both new and
recurring, that are associated with the idea of law.35 Some version
of “generative narrative” continuously maintains our perception of
law. Generative narratives contain a unique element of vitality that
remains ever operative and that continuously maintains
apperception which is, following Paul Lehman, “the uniquely
human capacity to know something without knowing how one has
come to know it.”36
Secondary generative narratives shape and define legal
categories, or the different legal concepts and principles. Law rests
on narrative to make sense of basic, organizing legal ideas. Thus,
for instance, in order to conceive the notions of liability and
responsibility, we must employ organizing narratives. As Binder
and Weisberg explain, “an assignment of casual responsibility
involves a short chain of casual explanation, a simple narrative
linking a harmful result to a blameworthy character.”37 Similarly,
there is the narrative of property (this is mine, so I can do whatever
I want with it), narrative of contracts (I reached an agreement with
you, and agreements must be honored), and the narrative of
34

COVER, supra note 13, at 96.
Modes of generative narrative are also created within our personal experience. Cf.,
Engel, supra note 12 (showing how parents of disabled children tell similar stories about
the first day of diagnosis). These origin narratives confront law and myth, empower
parents, and help them to negotiate their way through legal and educational systems.
36
PAUL LEHMANN, THE DECALOGUE AND A HUMAN FUTURE: THE MEANING OF THE
COMMANDMENTS FOR MAKING AND KEEPING HUMAN LIFE HUMAN 23 (1994).
37
BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 13, at 264.
35
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constitutional law (we need to define and protect superior norms to
maintain social order), and so on.
Some of the secondary generative narratives are created by
historical occurrences. Thus, the constitutional narratives of
America include stories about the colonies’ quest for religious
freedom and the stories of slavery and civil war. It is hard to
imagine conveying the principles of American constitutional law
without these stories. However, generative narratives often contain
a subversive seed, and carry the potential not only to entrench
hegemony, but also to deconstruct it. The slavery story, for
example, can be perceived as a story that strengthens law, and
defines it as a practice that can rectify itself. On the other hand,
the same story can be perceived as a constant reflection of law’s
failure to address injustice.38 Be that as it may, the opposed
understandings illuminate the unique properties of the narrative
mode of knowing: its potential to validate, while constantly
challenging, our cultural practices.
III. FUNCTIONAL NARRATIVES
Functional narratives are the stories that penetrate and facilitate
numerous aspects of daily legal activities. In their classic article,
The Emergence and Transformation of Dispute: Naming, Blaming,
Claiming . . . ,39 Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat describe legal claims as
a process motivated and activated by narrative. In order to pursue
a claim despite the burdens and risks involved, claimants must
characterize themselves as grievants, identify antagonists and
compose a quest in which they are called to enlist and fight
injustice. This process of narrative framing is essential to the
functioning of the legal machinery.40 Many other legal activities
depend upon the ability to identify plots and manipulate stories or
to employ functional narratives.
38

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 201 (1981). For
a detailed discussion of the manifold facets of the slavery story, see BINDER & WEISBERG,
supra note 13, at 268–87.
39
William L. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Dispute: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1981).
40
Id.
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Functional narratives come in many variations and their impact
can be described in different modes. As an example, the legal
argument relies on selective arrangements of events in narrative
forms. Competing stories are told about the same events,
reflecting competing interests. Thus, for instance, the aim of the
prosecutor in a criminal trial is to present a certain chronology of
events in a manner that will convince the judge or jurors that the
accused indeed carried out a certain crime. The aim of the defense
lawyer is to present a different chronology of events which refutes
the conclusion that the accused committed the crime. After
coming to a decision, the judge creates her own narrative in her
judgment.
Functional narratives are used and interpreted incessantly by
plaintiffs and defendants, accused and witnesses, lawyers, and
jurors. Different functional narratives are employed in different
areas of the legal arena. Trial narratives are told differently from
plea bargaining narratives41 and different courtroom actors (judge,
jurors, prosecutor, defense attorney, witnesses) manifest different
kinds of storytelling and story-listening abilities.42
Further demonstrating the inevitability of the narrative mode of
knowing within the legal field, judges also activate functional
narratives. Adjudication might be described by using narrative
terms; a judge who looks at a particular case is actually facing an
idiosyncratic story. Taking this story, and discarding several
layers of it until the core narrative is exposed, the judge then fits
this exposed core narrative to one of the existing narrative
templates. For example, there is a narrative template that refers to
first-degree murder and another one that refers to manslaughter.
The judicial process determines how to treat the unique story and
the court decides if it conforms with the murder narrative template
or with the manslaughter one. Judging, in this sense, means
assessing stories.

41

Douglas M. Maynard, Narratives and Narrative Structure in Plea Bargaining, 22
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 449, 479 (1988).
42
W. LANCE BENNET & MARTHA FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE, at ix (1981).
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This brings to mind Vladimir Propp’s work in The Morphology
of Folktale, where he isolated and identified the basic units of
narratives and the principles of their combination.43 In a way,
some of law’s practices are similar. Law takes as basic data all the
known stories concerning human behavior, isolates the primary
units of those stories, and determines the possible combinations
and their ensuing results. Judges compare the narratives brought
before them to the primary list of narrative templates. They match
disparate stories and discover parallels and similarities, as well as
the dissimilarities. Each and every individual case is deconstructed
and transformed into a labeled narrative. One story becomes
“negligent act,” another becomes “criminal offense,” and so on.
Judging, in a sense, is really a matter of sorting out and identifying
narratives and inferring their legal consequences.44
In other words, judges confront cases as competing stories, and
sift through precedents and through their own internal stories, in
search of sufficiently similar narratives, in order to facilitate the
categorization of each case.45 Next, in the written judgment, they
transform the chosen story into a new one that combines the
template story they chose with the unique character of any specific
43
VLADIMIR PROPP, MORPHOLOGY OF THE FOLKTALE (Louis A. Wagner ed., Laurence
Scott trans., 2d ed. 1968) (1928).
44
In this kind of narrative discourse, the surplus information—the data that does not fit
the narrative template—is not valueless and has important functions. Each story’s
particular details endow it with its unique character and special impact. The fact that Red
Riding Hood wore a red riding hood is perhaps redundant to the narrative template that is
linked to her story, but this detail etches the story in our collective memory. In a similar
way, O.J. Simpson’s identity is redundant to the several templates that are connected to
his case, but the specific identity of Simpson makes those templates stand out and
activates our emotional and ideological responses to them. Interview with Gabriel Zoran,
Professor of Literature and Comparative Literature, in Haifa, Isr. (Nov. 2001).
45
One author’s description of this process:
But once you tell your story into the law, it becomes the object of a precise
semantic dissection. The whole of the story is of no interest; instead, patient
surgeons of language wait and watch, snip and assay, looking for certain
phrases, certain words. Particular locutions trip particular legal switches, and
set a heavy machine in motion.
D. GRAHAM BURNETT, A TRIAL BY JURY 45–46 (2001). See also BENNET & FELDMAN,
supra note 42, at 64 (“This theory of stories . . . explains how ordinary persons can make
sophisticated judgments about complex information . . . .”). Bennet and Feldman contend
that stories, for the jury, are much more than a descriptive tool, organizing constructs
enabling the evaluating and judging of complex situations.
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case. The narratives created at this stage are intended not only to
deliver the normative guideline (such as acquittal or conviction and
sentence), but also to specify the factual grounds relevant to the
normative guideline, and to persuade the audience of its
correctness and inevitability.
The judicial style applied in countries with legal systems
originating in the common law permits judges, and even appellate
judges who generally are not responsible for fact finding,
significant freedom of narrative and rhetoric. Judges elaborate
upon or redact the survey of relevant facts based on all the
circumstances of the case and their personal style and choices.46 In
several Continental legal systems, the judicial style is different. It
is as concise as possible, lacks personal tones, and the narrative
descriptions tend to be minimalist.47 This distinction apparently
ensues from a basic difference between the Continental and AngloAmerican systems of law. Whereas the former is primarily based
on doctrine, the latter has developed from “case law” that is based
on precedents and judicial decisions. In a legal system with such
an orientation, great importance is placed on the details of the
narrative that underlie very precedent.48
However, even within the systems that tend to minimize the
use of overt narrativity in judgments, in legal doctrine, or even in
the legal culture at large, the fundamental legal functions of
assessing and processing stories are ever present. The difference
in external manifestations of narrative style does not influence the

46

See Bernard S. Jackson, Narrative Theories and Legal Discourse, in NARRATIVE IN
CULTURE: THE USES OF STORYTELLING IN THE SCIENCES, PHILOSOPHY, AND LITERATURE
23–50 (Christopher Nash ed., 1990) (illustrating the connections between the content and
materials of the narrative and the legal outcome in English case law); Esin Orucu, Mixed
and Mixing Systems: A Conceptual Search, in STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND
MIXING 335–52 (Esin Orucu et al. eds., 1996) (elaborating on the manner of writing in
the common law legal systems).
47
See MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 135 (1982)
(pointing out the extreme brevity of the statement of facts in the “cryptic” judgments of
the French Court of Cassation); Orucu, supra note 46 (reviewing the differences in this
connection between the common law and Continental legal systems and considering the
historical reasons for these differences).
48
See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward A Sociology of the Juridical Field,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 822–23 (1987) (describing this distinction between the systems).

1-ALMOG FORMAT

2002]

12/12/02 12:20 PM

CYBERSPACE, NARRATIVE, AND LAW

15

essentiality of narrative cognizance within any given legal
system.49
Undoubtedly, the relationship between law and narrative is
manifold and ambivalent. As Sarat points out, the connections
between law and language and the perception of the law as a
“literary” occupation may be seen by some as threatening because
they emphasize the manipulative aspects of the law and raise
arguments concerning its unswerving objectivity.50 Indeed, law as
a system of adjudication cannot allow a free narrative flow. A
narrator who enters a legal field is never permitted to roll out a
story, freely and fully, according to style, need, or talent. Law has
numerous tools that assume “narrative monitoring” functions.
Among these tools are the rules of procedure and evidence, the
rigid structures of legal doctrines and legal documentation, and
conventions that form our expectations from law as well as law’s
limitations. Formally, law is not interested in narratives as such,
but in certain facts that generate certain legal outcomes. Yet, in
spite of those reservations, it seems that the use of narrative in
various forms and manifestations is intrinsic to law.
IV. INTENET AND NARRATIVE: VANISHING STORIES IN VIRTUAL
SPACE
People are turning to their computers in their search for
knowledge with greater regularity. The Internet offers a reservoir
of data, which, for all practical purposes, may be termed infinite,
as it is multiplying every minute. In fact, it is impossible to
completely “understand” or “grasp” the entire data array.51 In
49

It should be noted that a decision to negate a particular dimension of the narrative,
such as by “creating” one that is tabula rasa, is actually a form of interpretation and
manipulation. Since it prevents those exposed to the blank narrative from seeing the facts
in a certain manner, it necessarily drives them in a different direction. Thus, “lean”
narratives can be as effective, interpretive, and manipulative as “generous” ones.
50
Austin Sarat, Editorial Introduction, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 1 (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994).
51
Recently, attempts have been made to measure the amount of information produced
in the world each year. A research study carried out by the School of Information
Management and Systems at the University of California at Berkeley concluded that the
world’s total yearly production of print, film, optical, and magnetic content would require
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many cases, the Internet is an extremely useful and timesaving
practical tool, whether one needs to find information, to
communicate, or to engage in artistic endeavors. Furthermore, the
Internet is a main source of recreation, as people spend more and
more time at their screens in order to be entertained.
Whatever the motivation may be for using the Internet, and
whatever link we choose to follow, we are never at the beginning,
middle, or end of anything, but always at some contingent point
that cannot be located on a chronological continuum, nor in any
other kind of defined space or construct. The Web offers a
practically endless flux that is entirely at our disposal, although
“entirely” in this context could mean nothing. The effect of
exposure to the constant flow of data could be the loss of ability to
distinguish any defined or meaningful sections within it. This
characterization of the Internet is highly relevant to narrative
cognizance.
One way to comprehend how narrative works is to focus upon
“its apparent claim to rescue meaning from temporal flux.”52
Narrative creates a structure that refers to different dimensions of
time, to the link between the past and what exists in another
temporal dimension. This creates the narrative’s “peculiar relation
to beginnings and ends.”53 Even when we deal with a non-linear
narrative that makes use of means such as deviations and retreats,
the awareness of some kind of temporal axis is preserved. The
roughly 1.5 billion gigabytes of storage. This is the equivalent of 250 megabytes per
person for each man, woman, and child on earth. These numbers are increasing and some
are even doubled every year. Until 2000, the amount of information accumulated all over
the world was 12 billion gigabytes. The Internet is one of the fastest growing media in
today’s world. The research shows that the static, publicly available Web pages (the
“surface” Web) consist of approximately 2.5 billion documents, up from 1 billion pages
at the beginning of the year, with a rate of growth of 7.3 million pages per day. The total
amount of information on the “surface” Web varies somewhere from 25 to 50 terabytes
of information. It seems that we cannot practically handle this amount of information.
Hal R. Varian, who carried out this research with Peter Lyman, concludes that we are
drowning in a sea of information. Better understanding and better tools are desperately
needed if we are to take full advantage of the ever-increasing supply of information and
to swim in it, rather than drown. See Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much
Information? (2000), at http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info/
(last visited Nov. 19, 2002).
52
BROOKS, supra note 7, at 90.
53
Id.
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temporal structures can be intricate. Christain Metz describes the
doubly temporal sequence of the narrative: there is the time of the
thing told and the time of the telling.54 This duality enables us to
create a special “narrative time,” e.g., three years of a hero’s life
summed up in two sentences, etc., but it also shows the unique
ability of the narrative:
[I]t invites us to consider that one of the functions of
narrative is to invent one time scheme in terms of another
time scheme—and that is what distinguishes narrative from
simple description (which create space in time), as well as
from the image (which creates one space in another
space).55
This distinction, between the story and the image, is highly
relevant to the Internet experience. The Web deeply affects our
ability to focus upon the temporal. It is the essential character of
the Web that denies us the option of finalizing the claim to define
meaning out of chaos. The result is deterioration of the ability to
create and observe narrative structures that need some sense of
temporality.
Contrarily, it has been suggested that the multiplicity,
polyphony, and dynamics that characterize the Web are actually
fertile grounds for a new kind of narrative discourse. According to
this contention, the Internet forms a contemporary, non-linear,
even anti-linear narrative, which every user shapes interactively
and creatively according to their personal narrative needs, desires,
urges, and preferences; in this perception, the Internet is actually a
vast “emporium of stories.” It offers us choices from an endless
range of plots. Every site is, in this sense, a story or many stories
presented for our perusal. Indeed, some hypertext theorists, such
as Richard A. Lanham56 and George P. Landow,57 imagine new
forms of discourse that make readers more active participants.
Other theorists recognize the danger of getting lost in
54

Christain Metz, Notes Toward a Phenomenology of the Narrative, in THE NARRATIVE
READER 87 (Martin McQuillan ed., 2000).
55
Id.
56
RICHARD A. LANHAM, THE ELECTRONIC WORD: DEMOCRACY, TECHNOLOGY AND THE
ARTS (1993).
57
LANDOW, supra note 5.
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informational anarchy.58 This danger is related to the undermining
of narrative consciousness initiated by the Internet experience.
Even if all the narrative components are floating in virtual space,
meaningful narratives are not created in the majority of cases.
Generally, the Internet does not turn into an “emporium of stories”
because its very nature contradicts narrative discourse.
The Internet urges the user to constantly move forward in order
not to miss the next image, the next screen, the next site, the next
stimulation. Using the Internet is like being in a perpetual state of
searching, in an endless chase that will rarely shape itself into any
organizing insight. However, it is important to emphasize that
neither the interactivity nor the anti-linearity that characterize
certain aspects of the Internet experience necessarily impairs
narrativity.
Interactivity could become an enriching element in any
narrative. Laurence Sterne writes about the ways in which the
narratee’s active participation is achieved in The Life and Opinions
of Tristram Shandy, a celebrated tour de force that is a masterly
constructed early hypertext:
Writing, when properly managed, (as you may be sure I
think mine is) is but a different name for conversation: as
no one, who knows what he is about in good company,
would venture to talk all; so no author, who understands the
just boundaries of decorum and good breeding, would
presume to think all: The truest respect which you can pay
to the reader’s understanding, is to halve this matter
amicably and leave him with something to imagine, in his
turn, as well as yourself.
For my own part, I am eternally paying him
compliments of this kind, and do all that lies in my power
to keep his imagination as busy as my own.59

58

Henry Jenkins, The Work of Theory in the Age of Digital Transformation, in A
COMPANION TO FILM THEORY 234, 247 (Toby Miller & Robert Stam eds., 1999).
59
LAURENCE STERNE, THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF TRISTRAM SHANDY, GENTLEMAN 83
(Ian Watt ed., 1965).
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Sterne uses the concepts of “digression” and “progression” to
illustrate the intricate course along which he maneuvers his
writing.
In The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy,
progression, the chronological advance of the main plot along the
“King’s Highway,” is constantly delayed due to innumerable and
fascinating detours, leading to side-roads and by-roads called
digressions, which Sterne loves: “Digressions, incontestably, are
the sunshine;—they are the life, the soul of reading;—take them
out of this book for instance,—you might as well take the book
along with them;—one cold eternal winter would reign in every
page of it.”60
There is nothing contingent about digressions, however. They
must be controlled and carefully planned. Progressions and
digressions imply that “when a man is telling a story . . . he is
obliged continually to be going backwards and forwards to keep all
tight together in the reader’s fancy.”61 Keeping “all tight together
in the reader’s fancy” is the heart of the matter. Narrative that
“works,” even when it has digressive detouring or “jumpy”
dimensions, eventually leads our imagination towards one
expression, potent enough to evoke significant ideological and
emotional responses. A mere sequence of data, facts, images, or
links does not create a story, and does not produce such a response.
Narrative is a construct, although it is potentially hidden and
complex. It need not be “orderly,” yet it must have some internal
order, and must possess proportions that conform to the sphere of
human activity. The Internet creates an articulate overflowing of
words that lacks internal order. Its proportions and substance
prevent us from grasping it as a whole or generating particular
narratives from it.62
60

Id. at 55.
Id. at 351.
62
That point could be illustrated by referring to the hermeneutic circle. According to
this image, the meaning of a part must be based on the understanding of an entirety in
which the part belongs. But if one cannot understand the whole without understanding
the parts, and the part cannot be understood without knowing its relationship with the
whole, the result is a tautology: one cannot understand the whole without understanding
the whole. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, On the Circle of Understanding, in HERMENEUTICS
VERSUS SCIENCE?: THREE GERMAN VIEWS: ESSAYS 68–78 (John M. Connolly & Thomas
Keutner eds. & trans., 1988) (1954).
61
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There is a significant difference between active and creative
“conversation,” to use Sterne’s expression, and the interactivity
associated with the Internet. In the former instance, narrative
invokes responses created and constructed for our consumption.
The “conversation” that readers conduct with the writer has no
influence upon the finality of the text with which they are dealing.
The story remains intact, ready to stimulate further “conversations”
with further readers. Usually, the interactivity of web users does
not evolve into a “conversation” between narrators and readers
because it does not stem from a constructed, final narrative. The
interactivity of Internet users operates in an open-ended system
that denies the possibility of closure and hence, the probability of
the creation of an effective story. The never-ending quality of the
Internet is actually anti-narrative in nature. Interactivity applied in
an anti-narrative environment lacks the potency necessary to create
a story.63
V. LAW AND WEB
A. Law in an Anti-Narrative Environment: Overdose of Simulacra
and Legal Stories
What the Internet produces by the endless stream of changing
sights, images, and copies is actually an extreme manifestation of
simulacra. The perception of the simulacrum was developed by
several thinkers, among them Jameson,64 Baudrillard,65 and

63

It is worth mentioning that some Internet theorists have pursued the notion that a new
concept of construct will eventually emerge:
In this shifting electronic space, writers will need a new concept of structure.
In place of a closed and unitary structure, they must learn to conceive of their
text as a structure of possible structures. The writer must practice a kind of
second-order writing, creating coherent lines for the reader to discover without
closing off the possibilities prematurely or arbitrarily. This writing of the
second order will be the special contribution of the electronic medium to the
history of literature.
JAY DAVID BOLTER, WRITING SPACE: THE COMPUTER, HYPERTEXT, AND THE HISTORY OF
WRITING 144 (1991). See also LANDOW, supra note 5, at 103–07.
64
Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 146 NEW
LEFT REV. 53 (1984).
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Deleuze and Guattari.66 It refers to contemporary culture as a
continuous flow of images or copies “whose relation to the model
has become so attenuated that it can no longer properly be said to
be a copy.”67 The perception that has often been applied in the
field of modern art critique quickly became relevant to popular
culture and contemporary culture at large, as well as the domain of
contemporary media. When the electronic media provides us with
an incessant flow of news, images, pictures, and speech, we are
offered endless repetitions. “Reality,” “truth,” “integrity,” and
“authenticity” are terms that lose tangible meaning within the
simulacrum. The simulacrum also devours narrative structure,
which must cling to some primary authentic model in order to be
effective, because narrative means representation, not simulation.
The simulacra phenomenon has “pre-Internet” manifestations.
In his seminal essay, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction, Walter Benjamin surveys the gradual development
of our ability to duplicate:
The enormous changes which printing, the mechanical
reproduction of writing, has brought about in literature are
a familiar story. However, within the phenomenon which
we are here examining from the perspective of world
history, print is merely a special, though particularly
important, case. . . .
. . . Just as lithography virtually implied the illustrated
newspaper, so did photography foreshadow the sound film.
The technical reproduction of sound was tackled at the end
of the last century. These convergent endeavors made
predictable a situation which Paul Valéry pointed out in
this sentence: “Just as water, gas, and electricity are
brought into our houses from far off to satisfy our needs in
response to a minimal effort, so we shall be supplied with
65

JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION (Sheila Faria Glaser trans., 1994)
(1981).
66
GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, ANTI-OEDIPUS (Robert Hurley et al. trans.,
1977) (1972).
67
Brian Massumi, Realer Than Real: The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and
Guattari, 1 COPYRIGHT (1987), available at http://www.anu.edu.au/HRC/first_and_last/
works/realer.htm (n.d.).
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visual or auditory images, which will appear and disappear
at a simple movement of the hand, hardly more than a
sign.”68
Benjamin also writes about the blurring of distinctions between
authors and their audience in the age of mass press, the changes in
temporal perceptions caused by the emergence of film, and the
way in which sequences of moving pictures distract the mind and
affects the ability to develop valid assessments and judgments.69
All of these characterize the Internet experience. In concurrence
with Benjamin’s ideas, much as the photographing techniques
carried the seed of the cinema technology, the technological
developments of the previous century carried the seed of the
Internet phenomenon. Yet, the Internet created unique and
unprecedented manifestations.70

68

Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in VIDEO
CULTURE: A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION 27, 28–29 (John G. Hanhardt ed., 1986) (footnote
omitted).
69
In another essay, Benjamin writes about the gradual fading of stories, a phenomenon
which he relates to the invention of print, and to the blossom of the novel in the modern
age:
[T]he art of storytelling is coming to an end. Less and less frequently do we
encounter people with the ability to tell a tale properly. More and more often
there is embarrassment all around when the wish to hear a story is expressed. It
is as if something that seemed inalienable to us, the securest among our
possessions, were taken from us: the ability to exchange experiences.
Walter Benjamin, The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov, in
ILLUMINATIONS 83 (H. Arendt ed., H. Zohn trans., 1968) (1936).
70
There are different attitudes to the distinction between the Internet and the
technologies that preceded it, and to the need for legal modifications. As Stuart Biegel
describes:
At one end of the spectrum are those who recognize occasional differences,
conceding in certain limited cases that some new rules and regulations may be
necessary. Others may go much further, arguing that today’s networked
computer environment is different enough—both in its design and in the nature
of the online activity that takes place—to merit new and different approaches to
regulatory issues that inevitably arise. Finally, at the other end of the spectrum,
are those who would go so far as to argue that the online world is
metaphysically both a different place and time, transcending commonly
accepted notions of geography and duration.
STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL? CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF OUR LEGAL
SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 31 (2001) (citing Paul Valéry, The Conquest of
Ubiquity, in AESTHETICS 226 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1964) (1928)).
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Baudrillard uses the term “hyperspace” in order to characterize
the American deserts he traveled.71
The essence of this
“hyperspace,” wrote Baudrillard, is the “disappearance of all
aesthetic and critical forms of life in the irradiation of an objectless
neutrality.”72 A similar characterization could be attributed to the
virtual “hyperspace,” the desert of the Internet. In this realm, any
claim of authority and legitimacy is in the nature of a fata
morgana, or mirage. Any moment of authority is an illusionary
image that will soon fade and vacate its place for the next image in
the endless cycle of the electronic simulacrum.
This loss of authority and legitimacy carries special importance
when we reach the realm of law. As Franco Moretti wrote:
It is not enough that the social order is “legal”; it must also
appear symbolically legitimate. . . .
. . . It is . . . necessary that . . . one perceives the social
norms as one’s own. One must internalize them and fuse
external compulsion and internal impulses into a new unity
until the former is no longer distinguishable from the latter.
This fusion is what we usually call “consent” or
“legitimation.”73
Indeed, the legal system, any legal system, derives its power from
symbolic legitimacy based upon social consent and legitimacy that
grew and developed during a long and complex “apprenticeship”
process. This never-ending process requires the use of stories.
Narratives constantly sustain and nourish the law’s authority, while
the simulacrum that discards narrative structure also discards some
of our convictions about law.
In a culture flooded with data that never crystallizes into
distinct and particular stories, with images of images, with clichés
that derive their “inspiration” from other clichés, law, like
everything else, becomes meaningless. When law merges into the
hyper-real-domains Web, what follows is the disintegration of
71

JEAN BAUDRILLARD, AMERICA 124 (Chris Turner trans., 1999) (1986).
Id.
73
FRANCO MORETTI, THE WAY OF THE WORLD: THE BILDUNGSROMAN
CULTURE 16 (Albert Sbragia trans., 1987).
72
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legal generative narratives, and the breakthrough of the borders
that define functional narratives. Consequently, this affects the
ability to take normative stands and assess situations morally and
emotionally.
Richard Sherwin, in a work focusing upon the influence of
popular culture on law, describes the effects on legal reality of the
incessant flow of images, recycled from network to network:
They conjure a world robbed of personality, motivation,
intentionality, and a story robbed of a structure that allows
the listener to make sense of human actions and
interactions. Such psychological fatality is intolerable to
those—judges, jurors, lawyers, victims, suspects,
spectators, and media producers—who face the law’s
demand for public judgment. Without coherent stories,
judgment becomes impossible.74
Indeed, the diminished use of narrative as a way of perceiving law
predates the Internet. However, the “Rule of Web” accentuates
such a process and carries it to an extreme.
First, because the Internet is a sprawling medium that expands
uncontrollably in all directions, it produces more simulacra than
ever before. This inescapable, uncontrollable vastness, this
overdose of simulacra, creates the difference and affects culture in
unfamiliar ways. Within the flood of simulacra, the narratives of
law turn into empty, powerless images.
Internet users differ in another way from mass media
consumers; they are not necessarily passive. Many of them make
the Web wider while consuming it.75 They are not only users, but
also interpreters and creators of additional virtual simulacra. The
immense hypertext to which we are constantly exposed, the global
74

RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW
130 (2000).
75
One example of the interactivity that characterizes the Web experience is the
Weblogs phenomenon. Weblogs are personal Web sites for expressing feelings and
sharing songs, poems, artwork, and thoughts. Today, there are about a half-million
Weblogs and a new “blogger” is joining every 40 seconds. Blogger’s motives included
“need for attention, a mania to share information, and, above all, a desire to be a
participant and not a potato.” See Steven Levy, Living in the Blog, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26,
2002, at 44–45.
AND POPULAR CULTURE
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electronic data flow, affects the ability to develop narrative
knowledge of reality. As a result, the ability to use evaluative,
emotional, and critical reflection is influenced. Furthermore, there
is a possible link between the decline of story phenomena and two
significant Internet-related issues. First is the way in which
research engines influence the way we think about law. Second is
the accumulating difficulty in applying existing law in the Internet.
Lexis and Westlaw, as well as other electronic networks that
serve the legal profession, are emblematic of the electronic
revolution.76 Those devices dramatically transform the ways in
which we produce legal insights, answers, and information. In preInternet days, when we sought knowledge relevant to a specific
legal issue, we were required to go to libraries, where we looked
for relevant stories. Often, we had to initially determine the story
of a case, and then advance by looking for relevantly similar
stories. Mastering such techniques required time and experience,
and was often rewarded with serendipitous insights and broad,
intricate observations.
Computerized search techniques changed all of this. If the
contemporary researcher wants to explore, for instance, the links
between constitutional law and tort law, she will not consider
narratives in which those two doctrines intersect. She will not
search for the “core story” of constitutional tort and how it differs
from the one of constitutional rights. She will, instead, type some
key words, such as “constitution and tort,” and then command the
computerized search engine to initiate its rapid Web search. One
problem is the random nature of the results she will generate
because the vastness of the Web dictates that search engines are
only able to cover a fraction of it.77 In this sense, using the Internet
in order to obtain certain information is similar to casual surfing—
in both cases the interaction with the Web manifests a haphazard
quality. Furthermore, most computer searches use Boolean logic.
Michael Heim explains the consequences:
76

Richard A. Lanham, The Electronic Word: Literary Study and the Digital
Revolution, 20 NEW LITERARY HIST. 265, 272 (1989).
77
See Steve Laurence & Lee Giles, Accessibility and Distribution of Information on the
Web, at http://www.wwwmetrics.com (last visited Sept. 28, 2002). 1999 research by
NEC reveals that mechanisms cover only 16% of the Web’s pages.
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When we pose a question to the Boolean world, we use
keywords, buzzwords, and thought bits to scan the vast
store of knowledge. Keeping an abstract, cybernetic
distance from the sources of knowledge, we set up tiny
funnels to capture the onrush of data. The funnels sift out
the “hits” triggered by our keywords. . . . We cover an
enormous amount of material in an incredibly short time,
but what we see comes through narrow thought channels.78
The “narrow thought channels” created by the computerized
searches do not exhibit the relevant stories; they run through
stories, distorting them or missing them altogether.
Highly available Internet search engines keep us away from
book libraries, which hold “unsystematic,” unfiltered collections of
stories. These stories are the essence and logic of law, and we
cannot afford to give them up. A research study constructed from
Internet search result could be inherently impaired because it lacks
the active intervention of imagination that is evoked, among other
things, by narratives.79 That is not to say that we should discount
legal search engines altogether, or that a well-tuned search cannot
produce adequate findings. But if we want to benefit from the

78

Michael Heim, Logic and Intuition, in COMPUTERS AND ETHICS IN THE CYBERAGE 81
(D. Micah Hester & Paul J. Ford eds., 2001).
79
Compare Theodore Roszak’s notions about necessity of keeping clear borders
between ideas and information:
It is only when we strike a clear distinction between ideas and information that
we can recognize that these are radically different levels of discourse requiring
different levels of evaluation. In most cases, we may be able to assess the data
that flow through the program as either “right” or “wrong,” a question of fact
that yields to standard research methods. But the ideas that govern the data are
not information; nor are they sacrosanct matters of mathematical logic. They
are philosophical commitments, the outgrowth of experience, insight,
metaphysical conviction, which must be assessed as wise or foolish, childlike
or mature, realistic or fantastic, moral or wicked. That critical project spans the
full range of computer software, from the video game that places the fanciful
annihilation of a galaxy beneath the power of a child’s thumb to the
computerized war machine that places the real choice of genocide before our
presidents and generals. . . . The computer can do no better than the quality of
the information selected by a human intelligence to be entered into it.
Theodore Roszak, Computers and Reason, in COMPUTERS AND ETHICS IN THE CYBERAGE
73 (D. Micah Hester & Paul J. Ford eds., 2001).
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reservoir of voices and thoughts embedded in stories, we cannot
rely on Internet searches as our sole provider of knowledge.80
The other issues worth considering in the context of the schism
between Internet and narrative are the practical and theoretical
difficulties often encountered while trying to apply traditional legal
concepts in Cyberspace. Those difficulties are related not only to
practical issues, such as the problem to enforce legal norms in
Cyberspace, but also to conceptual failure: the inability to
accommodate some of our secondary generative narratives in
virtual spaces. Consider, for instance, the conventional template
narratives of intellectual property, which stem from traditional
conceptions of authorship and the presence of an identifiable
creator, e.g., artist, author, painter, or actor, whose rights we wish
to protect, in certain aspects. But, as Landow points out,
contemporary technology both extends conventional conceptions
of intellectual property and makes its protection almost
inconceivable.81 He quotes, in this context, the testimony of
Steven W. Gilbert before a congressional committee: “When
almost any kind of ‘information’ in almost any medium can now
be represented and processed with digital electronics, the range of
things that can be considered ‘intellectual property’ is mindboggling.”82
This “mind-boggling” condition we experience does not
necessitate relinquishing intellectual property laws. Yet, it does
demand new conceptions of copyrights and new compatible
secondary generative narratives. The old narrative relates to
neither the economic volume nor the influence of modern “Internet
innovators,” e.g., Microsoft and similar large corporations, nor to
the rights of millions of individuals to free access and fair use. It is
80

See PETER B. MAGGS ET AL., INTERNET AND COMPUTER LAW (3d ed. 2000)
(considering whether there is such a subject as “Internet and Computer law”). A recent
Westlaw search for the word “Internet” found 1,262 cases in the “allfeds” database and
391 cases in “allstates.” A similar search for “shoe” found 28,269 federal and 37,0373
state cases. Id. The authors describe the misleading nature of this data. By itself it might
indicate that “shoes” are a much more significant legal story than “Internet.” This data
does imply that there is not anything peculiar about shoes, and that there is, on the other
hand, special nature that characterizes the Internet cases.
81
LANDOW, supra note 5, at 197.
82
Id.
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not feasible to address the current situation by means of the
traditional intellectual rights narrative, which focuses upon the
need to protect an individual artist or innovator laboring in their
attics. John Perry Barlow states that “there will be no property in
Cyberspace” since “[n]o law can be successfully imposed on a
huge population that does not morally support it.”83 Others
anticipate the emergence of new generative narratives that will
capture the complexity of the current situations. Richard Landow,
in order to reach such a novel story, evokes memories of an old
one—the narrative of feudalism: “Thus dividing the world into the
informationally rich and informationally impoverished, one may
add, would produce a kind of techno-feudalism in which those
with access to information and information technology would rule
the world from electronic fiefdoms.”84 In this context, Landow
also points to the movie Blade Runner, in which giant corporations
control information and power.85 Images borrowed from ancient
narratives are juxtaposed alongside those from modern science
fiction narratives to promote the conception of a new class of
copyright that protects the rights of authors while taking into
account emerging needs.
B. Law, Web, and Borders
Another legal difficulty in Cyberspace is the dissolution of
territorial borders. Until the advent of the Internet, all legal stories,
83

John P. Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas, at www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.10/
download.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2002). It is interesting to note the way Barlow uses
narrative in order to promote his standing. He illustrates the “paradigm shattering” nature
of the Napster affair, by looking at the American colonist liberation narrative: “What’s
happening with global, peer—to—peer networking is not altogether different from what
happened when the American colonists realized they were poorly served by the British
Crown: The colonists were obliged to cast off that power and develop an economy better
suited to their new environment.” Id. at *1. It is problematic to lean on the colonist
narrative in order to conclude that “there will be no property in the cyberspace,” because
Barlow ignores certain ensuing developments of this narrative. In fact, the American
colonists did not sail into a lawless future after detaching themselves from the English
crown. They merely exchanged one system of legal sovereignty for another, one
constituted independently to suit their needs and supported by new generative narratives.
A similar course might evolve in the Internet environment.
84
LANDOW, supra note 5, at 199.
85
BLADE RUNNER (Columbia TriStar Films 1982).
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generative and functional, shared a common attribute of occurring
in certain locations, within certain borders.
The Internet
experience distorts the perceptions of locations and borders, which
are essential to law and legal stories. Inevitably, generative and
functional narratives firmly established upon the conception of
borders are no longer effective. Discussed above, the metaphor of
a “narrative map” designates distinguishable narrative spaces in the
legal field and manifests the ways in which law and narrative
continuously intertwine. Johnson and Post suggest the metaphor of
a political map of the world that reflects geographical borders
between nation-states and other political entities.86 There has
been, until now, a general correspondence and overlap between a
“law map,” which delineates areas where different rules apply to
particular behaviors, and both the “narrative map,” and the
“political map.”87 As Johnson and Post indicate, “clusters of
homogenous applicable law and legal institutions fit . . . within
existing physical borders,”88 just as different modes of narrative
overlap certain areas of law. Yet, this is no longer true in either
case. The Internet exists everywhere, but nowhere in particular,
and as such, the narrative cognizance declines. Similarly, the
notions of borders and national and international sovereignty are
impaired: “Global computer-based communications cut across
territorial borders, creating a new realm of human activity and
undermining the feasibility—and legitimacy—of laws based on
geographic boundaries.”89 Again, in both cases one can assume
that new rules, motivated and bolstered by fresh narrative modes,
narrative capacities, and novel narrative templates, will emerge and
redefine borders, spaces, rights, and property templates.90
86

David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1368 (1996).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 1.
90
See NICHOLAS BLOMELY ET AL., THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, at xiiv (2001).
Narratives are used, even now, in order to grasp conceptual difficulties created by
Cyberspace. Thus, Blomley, Delaney, and Ford turn to stories to demonstrate the
challenge Cyberspace poses to both the theory and the practice of international legal
sovereignty. They parallel the 1884 Mignonette tragedy, Regina v. Dudley & Stephens,
14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng. 1884) (the trial of crew members who killed a cabin boy on the high
seas in order to survive), with a 1999 legal narrative about a Florida teenager who sent a
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Recently, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L’Antisemitisme91 revealed certain obstacles. Yahoo! asked the
United States District Court for the Northern District Court of
California to bar enforceability of a French judgment which
ordered Yahoo! to block the access of Nazi material,92 available
from Yahoo’s major site in California, from French Web users in
France. The French ordinance did not consider the United States
Constitution and the rights it endows, but the American court
decided that the French ordinance was incompatible with the First
Amendment.93 This decision demonstrates the kind of difficulties
inherent in the application of basic narrative templates within
Cyberspace when relying upon traditional perceptions of
sovereignty and borders.
Internet-related practices may distort stories and may affect our
narrative cognizance. Yet, narrative cognizance is the tool we
must preserve and nurture to face and manage some of the new
legal challenges created by the Internet. To illuminate this point
further and conclude, let us return now to Borges’ El Aleph.
The emotional and cognitive responses of the two central
characters reflect human response to the Web-like Aleph. Carlos
Argentino Daneri represents a lifetime of constant exposure to the
Aleph. The result in his case is “mental activity that was
continuous, deeply felt, far ranging and—all in all—

threat message to an online chat room. These stories explicate and address the
fundamental question, “where is law?”
91
169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
92
Licra v. Yahoo!, TGI Paris, Interim Order No. 00/05308, Nov. 20, 2001, available at
http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/001120yahoofrance.pdf.
93
Judge Fogel concluded:
Yahoo! seeks a declaration from this Court that the First Amendment precludes
enforcement within the United States of a French order intended to regulate the
content of its speech over the Internet. Yahoo! has shown that the French order
is valid under the laws of France, that it may be enforced with retroactive
penalties, and that the ongoing possibility of its enforcement in the Unites
States chills Yahoo!’s First Amendment rights. Yahoo! also has shown that an
actual controversy exists and that the threat to its constitutional rights is real
and immediate. Defendants have failed to show the existence . . . of a genuine
issue of material fact . . . . Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment will
be granted.
Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1194.
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meaningless.”94
For years he had been toiling over the
composition of a poem called The Earth. In this significant
undertaking, Daneri attempts “to set to verse the entire face of the
planet,”95 without excluding a single detail. The Aleph is the
source of inspiration for this vast and entirely redundant project.
In effect, he simply “cuts and pastes” thousands of fragments from
the Aleph and transforms them into a simulacrum. This process
suppresses any creative growth, as creativeness is replaced by an
obsessive, Sisyphean attempt to capture totality, and replicate
shreds of it. The product is worthless because it offers mere
simulation without genuine presentation or rendition of the
original.
Borges, as a character in the story (as well as in real life),
represents the opposite experience. In his first encounter with the
Aleph, Borges confronts “the rotted dust and bones that had once
deliciously been Beatriz Viterbo,”96 together with “a pack of
Spanish playing cards, . . . tigers, pistons, bison, tides and
armies,”97 Each item in this infinite circle loses its uniqueness and
becomes identical to the others. Yet, after the initial shock and
“infinite wonder, infinite pity,”98 of his first encounter with the
Aleph, the emotional response becomes blunted.
The
disappearance of differences breeds indifference. The exposure to
the Aleph causes emotional paralysis because it damages the
specific and particular quality that characterizes every experience:
Out on the street, going down the stairways . . . riding the
subway, every one of the faces seemed familiar to me. I
was afraid that not a single thing on earth would ever again
surprise me; I was afraid I would never again be free of all
I had seen.99
The infinity of links also signifies the absence of any context and
entails the dullness of significant emotional response. Borges
retreats from the Aleph, denying to Daneri what he has seen, and
94
95
96
97
98
99

Borges, supra note 3, at 16–17.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 28–29.
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does not return to it. He tries to forget it, and after a few sleepless
nights, he succeeds.
Does Borges’ refusal to “surf” represent a technophobic fear of
a new technology and his inability to control it and tame it, or does
it represent the survival impulse and the sober realization of human
limitations? The Borgesian flight from the Aleph signifies, among
other things, the dire need to preserve our ability to create and
maintain narrative constructs: the vehicles that transform
meaningless data into organized, meaningful templates, or into
stories. This enables us to preserve the symbolic authority and
routine functioning of the rule of law.
CONCLUSION: “THE SAME FEW PLOTS . . .”
“The same few plots, I am sorry to say, have pursued me down
through the years,” writes the septuagenarian Borges.100 The
secret of narrative is embedded in the human capacity to use and
reuse our basic narratives to create new stories, whatever the
endeavor—law, literature, film, or any other. In this first decade of
the third millennium, Cyberspace raises many questions and
dilemmas about law, culture, power, and creativity. In order to
grasp, assess, and address these questions, which may be new, we
still need stories that are rooted in our personal and collective
memories.
The relationships between Internet, narrative, and law are
highly dynamic and diffuse. It is too early to conclude that the
Internet will become either lawless or storyless. It is possible to
presume, however, that the Internet will promote significant
changes in the ways we use stories and the ways we understand
law. Traditional generative and functional narratives will not be
altogether abandoned, but perhaps transformed dramatically. In
time, the Web might produce its own generative narratives linked
to novel legal doctrines. If narratives are representations of human
possibilities, they will inevitably respond to our urgent needs.
Actually, that is one of the unique characterizations of the narrative
100
JORGE LUIS BORGES, DOCTOR BRODIE’S REPORT 10 (Norman Thomas di Giovanni
trans., 1972) (1970).
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mode—its capacity to ignite shifts of thought and practice.
Perhaps the Napster,101 Microsoft,102 and Yahoo!103 affairs and
their yet unknown sequels will provide the preliminary sources of
the next legally generative stories.
Be that as it may, stories and plots will remain as vital for law
as they are for many other social institutions. Since the Internet is
here to stay, one can anticipate a process that will modify our
narrative capacities and needs and connect them to the rule of the
Web.104 Imagination can take us to undreamed-of regions. Human
ingenuity, combined with imagination, transferred us all into the
realm of the Internet. In order to navigate safely within the space
of this novel, fictive-like realm, to perceive beginnings and ends,
and to maintain law, we must use stories as our oars and anchors.
Although the Internet has an outstanding contemporary quality, the
pertinent conflict between chaos and construct is not novel. The
vision of erecting a “city, and a tower whose top may reach into
heaven,”105 in which “the people is one, and they have all one
language,”106 has deep roots in human mythology. It is the vision
101

See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2186 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001).
102
See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
103
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
104
See JANET H. MURRAY, HAMLET ON THE HOLODECK: THE FUTURE OF NARRATIVE IN
CYBERSPACE (1997) (envisioning a “cyberbard,” a future storyteller who is “half hacker,
half bard,” that will carry literary imagination into unknown territories). New insights
and new ways to organize knowledge and thought in the Internet era are sought
constantly. See generally Nick Bingham, Unthinkable Complexity? Cyberspace
Otherwise, in VIRTUAL GEOGRAPHIES: BODIES, SPACE AND RELATIONS 244 (Mike Crang,
et al. eds., 1999); CYBERSPACE, CYBERBODIES, CYBERPUNK: CULTURES OF
TECHNOLOGICAL EMBODIMENT (Mike Featherstone & Roger Burrows eds., 1995); Marcus
A. Doel & David B. Clarke, Virtual Worlds: Simulation, Suppletion, S(ed)uction and
Simulacra, in VIRTUAL GEOGRAPHIES: BODIES, SPACE AND RELATIONS 261 (Mike Crang,
et al. eds., 1999); DONNA J. HARAWAY, MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENNIUM.
FEMALEMAN©_MEETS_ONCOMOUSE™: FEMINISM AND TECHNOSCIENCE (1997); Otto
Imken, The Convergence of Virtual and Actual in the Global Matrix: Artificial Life, Geo–
Economics and Psychogeography, in VIRTUAL GEOGRAPHIES: BODIES, SPACE AND
RELATIONS 92 (Mike Crang et al. eds., 1999); DAVID R. KOEPSELL, THE ONTOLOGY OF
CYBERSPACE: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2000);
PAUL VIRILIO, THE AESTHETICS OF DISAPPEARANCE (Philip Beichtman trans., 1991)
(1980).
105
Genesis 11:4.
106
Id. at 11:6.

1-ALMOG FORMAT

34

12/12/02 12:20 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 13:1

of controlling totality, which is often juxtaposed with the
nightmare of drowning in a limitless vastness.
The illustrated discord between the rule of the Web and the
loss of the story is a present-day echo of that ancient meta-story:
the annihilation of borders endangers the ability to perceive clearly
defined segments of reality, and potentially leads towards a
situation in which human beings “may not understand one
another’s speech.”107 When all stories become one, they become
none. However, as one interpretation of that ancient tale suggests,
a between the elements of narrative and of chaos must be reached,
and therefore is always reached.

107

Id. at 11:7.

